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SIPDIS

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TAGS: [PGOV](#) [ECON](#) [EAID](#) [KDEM](#) [IZ](#)

SUBJECT: ACTION PLAN TO BUILD CAPACITY AND
SUSTAINABILITY WITHIN IRAQ'S PROVINCIAL
GOVERNMENTS

REF: A. SECSTATE 81769

[1](#)B. BAGHDAD 02052

[1](#)C. MNF-I FRAGO 05-120

[1](#)1. (U) This is a U.S. Mission Baghdad/MNF-I
coordinated cable.

[1](#)2. (SBU) Summary. As directed by the references,
Provincial Support Teams (PST) and Provincial
Reconstruction and Development Committees (PRDC)
were established by June 2005 in all 15 non-KRG
provinces to accomplish their stated mission.
Efforts met with varied success in the provinces,
but PST's were generally unable to accomplish all
actions mandated. A comprehensive review of
actions taken to implement the initiative was
undertaken and the results, supported by weekly
assessments, revealed key weaknesses. In
conjunction with the review, U.S. Mission and MNF-
I jointly developed a follow-on initiative to
ensure unity of MNF-I and Mission effort in the
field in strengthening the capabilities of
provincial governments, assisting in the
coordination of USG reconstruction and development
assistance efforts, and providing enhanced
reporting on political developments and advocacy
of coalition political and economic policy goals.
The result of this effort is the recommendation to
deploy joint, civil-military Provincial
Reconstruction Teams to each of the 15 non-KRG
provinces, as well as a Regional Reconstruction
Team to the KRG. This cable lays out the
mission, tasks and goals related to implementation
of this new initiative. End Summary.

Background

[1](#)3. (SBU) An interim review of efforts, successes
and weaknesses relating to the PRDC initiative was
conducted in late July by Mission that identified
problem areas related to procedures,
infrastructure and resource allocation. In
August, MNF-I and Mission further evaluated the
impact that PSTs were having on developing the
capacity of provincial governments, as well as the
specific needs of the governmental elements.
Consensus was that PSTs were not effectively
developing governance capacity in the provinces,
but only on a very small scale, and that
fundamental change would be required in order to
accomplish priorities of action identified in
reference (B). Key factors in limiting the
successes of the PSTs included gaps in DOS
staffing and skill sets, limited PSD support, and
inconsistent support from MNF-I elements to the
initiative. In addition, the lack of a standing
body at the Mission/MNF-I level to support,
coordinate and guide activities of the PSTs was
identified as a key weakness.

[1](#)4. (U) As a result of the review, the Mission and
MNF-I have jointly developed an initiative to
strengthen our support to provincial governments
during this critical period in the development of
Iraq's democratic institutions. We started with a
revised mission statement to focus clearly on the
objectives of the new effort.

Newly Defined Mission and End State Goals

[1](#)5. (U) The proposed new mission statement for the
USG/Coalition effort to build capability and
sustainability of Iraq's provincial governments
is:

"To assist Iraq's provincial governments with
developing a transparent and sustained capability
to govern, promote increased security and rule of
law, promote political and economic development,

and provide provincial administration necessary to meet the basic needs of the population."

16. (SBU) The mission statement of our provincial initiative is intended to focus the effort on reaching an end state - or goals - that are achievable, well-defined and measurable, based on sound metrics. Accomplishment of these goals is essential to the evolution of a stable democracy in Iraq and facilitates increased stability throughout the Middle East. These goals are:

--Provincial governments that have a stabilized, transparent process for identifying redevelopment needs throughout their province, and a solid program to address redevelopment issues;

--Provincial governments that are confident and transparent in the execution of their duties and responsibilities;

--Provincial governments that have the support of their citizenry;

--Provincial governments that have increased efficiency and capability in the delivery of services to their citizens, and that are increasingly self-sufficient;

--Provincial governments that have regularized mechanisms for citizen participation in governmental decision-making processes;

--Provincial governments that have increased core competencies (public administration, finance and budgeting, urban/municipal planning) and accountability;

--Provincial governments that foster stability and security throughout their provinces; and

--Enhanced reporting and assessment on political and economic developments, and strategic activities at the local level, and advocacy of Coalition political and economic policy goals.

Mission Tasks

17. (SBU) The U.S. Mission and MNF-I have identified eight primary components inherent to the mission statement that serve to focus Coalition efforts and achieve the desired end state; these are:

--Facilitate achievement of Coalition goals in Iraq by enhancing the capabilities of provincial governments, with emphasis on capacity building and sustainability;

--Promote government reform at the provincial level and develop self-sufficiency;

--Assist provincial governments and local ministry representatives with developing a comprehensive strategy that results in a capable and accountable local government;

--Develop the ability of provincial governments to identify and prioritize the needs of their citizens, and to address those needs via Iraqi Government, Coalition, Donor, NGO and private resources;

--Develop the ability of provincial governments to devise short and long-term strategies for economic programs, and provide training and mentoring that will assist with their implementation;

--Assess and report political and economic developments at the local level, and advocate Coalition goals and objectives;

--Develop a phased plan for transition from heavy civil-military assistance to traditional post-conflict assistance, and finally to self-reliance;

--Coordinate all USG reconstruction, development and humanitarian assistance in the field; and

--Coordinate provincial governance capacity-building efforts with Coalition forces, in order to synchronize activities with stability operations.

Transition to Self-Reliance

18. (SBU) An Iraq that is democratic, stable, and economically viable in the free-market economy is key to its self-reliance and future role in Middle East and world affairs. The provincial development aspect of this initiative is to be coupled with a similar Mission/MNF-I initiative at the national/ministerial level geared toward developing a democratic, cohesive and capable government that fully integrates the cultural, religious and regional needs and desires of all of its citizenry. Both initiatives consider and plan for a phased transition to self-reliance that decreases the requirement for security forces to conduct stability operations, while the local and national governments increase their capability to govern and manage security.

19. (U) Inherent to developing the capacity and sustainability of the national and local governments are the civilian subject-matter experts available through MNC-I Civil Affairs elements and USAID programs, such as the Local Governance Program (LGP). In the provinces, LGP will form the heart of our efforts in a phased approach taking us out over the next four years. The LGP Work Plan will form the baseline document from which our efforts at training, mentoring and coaching will evolve.

110. (SBU) In executing this phased approach, we anticipate the necessity for a robust civil-military capability in each of the 15 non-KRG provinces for approximately two years, and in the KRG (based in Arbil) for a lesser period of time. During this timeframe - varying by province - we anticipate the security needs of the province diminishing as provincial governments demonstrate an increasing capability to govern and manage elements affecting their security environment. As this occurs, we will begin reducing the military role in the provincial teams and increasingly move the LGP elements toward a capability to continue with the initiative independent of Coalition Forces support.

111. (U) The focus of main effort at the provincial level will be in providing training, mentoring and coaching to provincial government entities, in order to develop their capacity to:

- Develop core competencies;
 - Establish effective provincial linkages with ministries and the central government;
 - Plan and prioritize provincial government direction and activities;
 - Prepare budgets, identify funding needs, and develop fiscal responsibility;
 - Determine government staffing requirements and address these via government code;
 - Plan and coordinate civil construction and development activities, and coordinate support by Iraqi national and local government resources, donors, NGOs and private capital investment;
 - Communicate with constituents via effective public affairs initiatives;
 - Provide and enhance the delivery of provincial and municipal services;
 - Develop by-laws and effective committee structures; and
 - Conduct local elections using uniformly applied model elections ordinance.
112. (U) Determining successful achievement of this initiative's goals will be based on qualitative measurements against established benchmarks. Mission and MNF-I are currently developing metrics that will cover three general areas: governance, infrastructure, and security. Each broad area will have sub-categories and indicators sufficient to provide a clear assessment that supports decision-making at the Mission, MNF-I and NCA level. Provincial teams will develop baseline assessments and follow with monthly assessments to the Mission/MNF-I.

Concept of Operations

13. (U) U.S. Mission and MNF-I, in coordination with Coalition partners, will establish joint, civil-military teams in each of the 15 non-KRG provinces, and one regional team for the KRG. Teams will be named Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT) and Regional Reconstruction Teams (RRT) respectively. Each team will be modular in nature, built around a standard core structure, and tailored to the specific needs of each province and region. In support of the PRT/RRTs, Mission/MNF-I will establish a National Coordination Team (NCT) to provide strategic guidance, direct operational activities, and provide direct and indirect logistics and administrative support to the PRT/RRTs.

14. (U) This is a coordinated U.S. Mission/MNF-I initiative that will fully integrate Coalition partners. It will be a DOS lead and with IRMO functioning as the executive agent. While the intention is to have a civilian Team Leader for each PRT/RRT, experience indicates that there will be circumstances where MNF-I will have the most experienced officer present. In such circumstances, and as directed by the NCT, the senior civilian will serve as the Deputy Team Leader. The PRT/RRT Team Leader will be responsible for all facets of the initiative at the provincial level, to include political liaison, governance development, reconstruction and Coalition assistance, assessments and reporting. The PRT/RRT will be subordinate to the NCT, and team members and elements of the PRT/RRT will be under operational control of the PRT Team Leader; administrative control will be retained by the parent unit/organization. The DOS Regional Coordinator, in collaboration with Coalition partners (where appropriate) and coordination with the NCT, will provide guidance regarding regional political and economic issues and initiatives.

15. (U) PRT/RRTs will be reliant on in-place REO and MNF-I/FOB support for housing, administration, logistics and security, where available; but, will have organic elements to support personnel movement security, communications and transportation. In remote areas, additional assets will be attached for force protection, logistics, vehicle maintenance, etc., as necessary. Where necessary, contract security assets will be under the operational control of the PRT/RRTs. State Embedded Teams (SET) will be absorbed into PRTs in provinces where SETs currently exist. In establishing PRT/RRTs, the intent is to build sufficient flexibility that will enable them to outlive current REO and MNF-I force positioning, as well as adapt to FOB closures.

16. (U) The National Coordination Team (NCT) will coordinate with Mission, MNF-I, Coalition Diplomatic Missions and Iraq's national government, under the direction of the NCT's Executive Committee. The Executive Committee will approve assignments of all Team Leader and Deputy Team Leader positions to PRT/RRTs.

PRT/RRT Structure and Organization

17. (U) The organization of the PRT/RRTs will be tailored to the specific needs of each province, built around a core structure. Additional personnel or elements will be detailed as required. The basic core structure of a PRT/RRT is as follows:

No.: Position Title, No. Pers., Mil/Civ/Cont/LN,
Source

1: PRT/RRT Team Leader, 1, Civilian (OC equiv),
DOS-IRMO/Coalition Partner

2: Assistant Team Leader, 1, Military Officer (O-5), MNF-I

3: Provincial Program Manager, 1, Civilian, (GS-14), DOS-IRMO

4: Political Officer, 1, Civilian (FS-02), DOS/Pol

5: USAID/DFID Officer, 1, Civilian/Contractor,
USAID/DFID

6: MSC Liaison Officer, 1, Military Officer (0-4),
MSC

7: Engineer Officer, 1, Military Officer (0-4),
MNF-I

8: Personal Security Det (Desig Sites only), 17,
Civilian Contractor, DOS

9: Movement Security Team, 17-26, Military
Officer/Enlisted, MSC

10: Civil Affairs/CIMIC Team(s), 4-20, Military
Officer/Enlisted, MSC

11: Provincial Partnership Program (P3), 2,
Military Officer/Civilian, MNSTC-I

12: Local Governance Team, 18-30, Civilian
Contractor/LN, USAID/LGP

13: Local national (LN) Translators, 4, Local
Nationals, DOS/USAID

18. (U) The core structure of the PRT/RRT will be augmented, as required by the unique security requirements, governance needs and in-place support structures (FOB, REO, Iraqi Base) existing in each province. This will include additional subject-matter experts that are needed for a particular province or region, force protection elements for site security and logistics support elements for remote sites located on non-Coalition facilities.

National Coordination Team

19. (U) The mission and purpose of the NCT will be to support the PRT/RRTs by synchronizing governance, reconstruction, security and economic development assistance, and providing coordination and deconfliction of provincial efforts with efforts of the Mission, Coalition partners and the Iraqi government. The Executive Committee of the NCT will be chaired by the Deputy Chief of Mission, and will provide strategic guidance to the NCT, develop and review policy, and resolve significant issues. Inherent tasks of the NCT are to:

--Coordinate with Iraqi ministries for development of sustainable support to provincial governments;

--Provide strategic guidance and direction to PRTs, based on Coalition priorities;

--Synchronize PRT/RRT regional efforts with Iraqi ministries, the US Mission and Coalition partners;

--Facilitate lines of communication between Iraq's provincial and national governments;

--Liaise and coordinate with Mission, Coalition Partners and MNF-I for logistics and administrative support to the PRT/RRTs;

--Coordinate with Mission, Coalition partners, Iraqi Government and MNF-I for liaison with Donor nations;

--Oversee political and economic reporting, and strategic advocacy efforts.

20. (U) The organization of the NCT will be built around a core structure, with additional representatives participating on an as-needed basis. The core structure of the NCT is as follows:

No.: Position Title, No. Pers., Mil/Civ/Cont/LN,
Source

1: Team Leader, 1, Civilian (OC), DOS/IRMO

2: Deputy Team Leader, 1, Military Officer (0-6),
MNF-I

3: Operations Officer, 1, Military Officer (0-5),
MNF-I

4: Political Advisor, 1, Civilian (FS-02), DOS
5: Public Diplomacy Advisor, 1, Civilian (GS-14), DOS
6: USAID Coordinator, 1, Civilian (GS-14), USAID
7: Plans Officer, 1, Military Officer (0-5), MNF-I
8: Assistant Operations Officer, 1, Military Officer (0-4), MNF-I
9: Assistant Plans Officer, 1, Military Officer (0-4), MNF-I
10: Administrative Specialist, 1, Military Enlisted (E-6), MNF-I
11: Administrative Specialist, 1, Military Enlisted (E-4), MNF-I
12: Office Manager, 1, Contractor, DOS/IRMO

Relationships

- ¶21. (U) The National Coordination Team provides strategic guidance, directs operational activities, and provides direct and indirect support to PRT/RRTs. The NCT is directed by the Executive Committee, who - in turn - reports to the Chief of Mission and CG, MNF-I.
- ¶22. (SBU) The DOS Regional Coordinator provides guidance, in coordination with the NCT, regarding regional political activities and regionally cross-cutting issues for the PRT/RRTs. This recognizes the need to maintain a regional perspective, in addition to a provincial focus.
- ¶23. (SBU) The PRT/RRT and MSC relationship is one of coordination and consultation. They will maintain close and constant communication, in order to ensure that security, governance and economic lines of operation are mutually reinforcing. The MSC commander will retain responsibility for security and stability operations, while the governance and economic lines of operation will become the responsibility of the PRT/RRT Team Leader.
- ¶24. (U) The PRT/RRT Team Leader has operational control (OPCON) over all assigned personnel and elements. Administrative Control (ADCON) will be retained by the parent organization (DOS, USAID, LGP, MNF-I, etc.)
- ¶25. (U) MSCs will be responsible for providing logistics, housing, security and transportation support to the PRT/RRTs from organic assets in all locations where DOS REO or SET facilities are insufficient to support PRT/RRT requirements.
- ¶26. (U) REOs will be responsible for providing logistics, housing, security and transportation support to the PRT/RRTs, within currently existing capabilities. In order to support this initiative, all SET assets will be absorbed by the provincial PRT.

Implementation

- ¶27. (SBU) The first step of this initiative will begin 01 Oct 05, with stand-up of the National Coordination Team (NCT), out of existing resources. The NCT will conduct planning necessary to begin phasing the deployment of PRT/RRTs on 01 Nov 05, to include coordinating with MSCs, RCs and supporting agencies, conducting site surveys and developing baseline assessments to guide stand-up planning.
- ¶28. (SBU) Provincial/Regional Reconstruction Teams will rolled out on an incremental basis, beginning with establishment of the first three "proof of concept" teams on 01 Nov 05, conditions permitting. We will roll out remaining teams incrementally, at an estimated rate of three per month. This incremental approach will allow us to make timely adjustments to the deployment sequencing and packaging of follow-on teams. The initial teams will stand-up for Anbar, Ninawa and Sala ad Din provinces.

129. (SBU) While proactive efforts will be taken to reassign and pre-stage elements to support this initiative, active engagement of local governments by the teams will not begin until teams have sufficient assets on hand to begin execution of the mission, and the NCT's Executive Committee has concurred. As the actual commencement of operational engagement of local government has significant political and diplomatic implications, this will be a coordinated decision involving senior Mission staff. Appropriate meetings between senior Mission staff and local government officials will be conducted in advance of each team becoming operationally active.

Personnel Support

130. (U) DOS Team Leader positions (16) will be filled from a variety of sources, to include DOS FSOs, 3161 civil service personnel and WAEs, if available. IRMO's existing authority to hire 3161 civil service personnel will be used, in conjunction with USAID contractor recruitment system, to reach out to the best qualified personnel experienced in post-conflict redevelopment, diplomacy and nation-building. In-place IRMO recruiting assets in Washington will coordinate with USAID for access to their cadre of former PSC personnel, etc., and DOS-HR for access to WAEs and FSOs.

131. Action Request. Request DOS-HR coordinate with USAID and IRMO recruiting staff to identify 16 qualified FSOs or WAEs for assignment to Team Leader positions.

132. (U) USAID Officer positions will be filled by a USAID officer.

133. (U) Political Officer positions will be filled by absorbing all IPAO positions currently resident at REOs into the PRT/RRTs, augmented by designated SET officers. Political Officers will continue to provide PolAd services to MSCs, as coordinated by the PRT/RRT Team Leader.

134. (U) IRMO Provincial Program Manager positions will continue to be filled via in-place IRMO recruiting assets, and will be supplemented by Bearing Point contractors, if necessary.

135. (U) Local Governance Program civilian personnel will be filled via standing USAID contract with Research triangle Institute under the LGP-II contract.

136. (U) MNF-I personnel assigned in support of this initiative will be as designated by MNF-I FRAGO. Personnel will be assigned OPCON to the PRT/RRT, while remaining ADCON to their parent organization.

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